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Criminal Procedure-Protection of Defendants Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states
may not place burdens on the assertion of a constitutional right that chill
its exercise by criminal defendants. 1 In Blackledge v. Perry' the Court
considered whether the power of the prosecutor to charge the defendant
with a more serious crime at a trial de novo placed an unconstitutional
burden on the right of appeal. The Court found that the situation
presented an opportunity for prosecutorial "vindictiveness" and therefore held -that the requirement of due process precluded a prosecutor
from raising the charge.'
Jimmy Perry was charged with a misdemeanor and convicted in the
North Carolina district court. He appealed to the superior court for a
trial de novo.4 After defendant's notice of appeal was filed, the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment against Perry based on the same
conduct as the misdemeanor charge. At the trial de novo defendant
pleaded guilty5 to the felony charge and was sentenced to a prison term.
1. See text accompanying notes 12-27 infra.
2. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
3. Id. at 28-29. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the majority, with Justices
Rehnquist and Powell dissenting. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion with
Justice Powell joining in Part I of that opinion. Id.
4. The trial de novo is a part of a two-tiered court system. An inferior court-the
district court in North Carolina-has limited jurisdiction over misdemeanors and provides only non-jury trials. A defendant convicted in district court has an absolute right to
a new trial in superior court regardless of plea, judgment or sentence. The superior court
has general criminal jurisdiction and jury trial is provided. In superior court the slate is
wiped clean, and new findings of law and fact are made without regard to error in the
lower court proceedings. N.C. GENr. STAT. § 7A-290 (Supp. 1B, 1974); see Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1972); State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765
(1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); State v. Bryant, 11
N.C. App. 423, 181 S.E.2d 211 (1971).
5. The Court's analysis of the defendant's guilty plea to the felony charge raised a
second issue which is in itself noteworthy. Prior decisions of the Supreme Court have
limited the review of convictions based on guilty pleas to the question of whether the
guilty plea was voluntary. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Relief has been denied to defendants who pleaded
guilty voluntarily even though there was a constitutional violation in the proceedings
"antecedent" to the guilty plea. Tolleit v. Henderson, supra at 265-66. In Blackledge,
however, the Court granted the defendant relief without regard to the voluntariness of
the plea because the due process violation went to the "power of the State to bring the
defendant into court" on the felony charge. 417 U.S. at 30. The Court distinguished the
prior cases on the ground that the constitutional defect in Blackledge could not be
"cured." Id. at 30-31. The remedy for the due process violation was "to prevent a trial
from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct

1975]

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

109

On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, defendant alleged that the
practice of increasing the charge at a trial de novo violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6
The issue before the Court was whether the practice of raising the

charge against a defendant at a trial de novo presented the "hazard of
vindictiveness." 7 The Court found that the prosecutor has a "considerable stake" in discouraging appeals since every appeal dissipates valuable

prosecutorial resources.8 The prosecutor can "up the ante" by raising the
charge and thus be assured that few defendants will "brave the hazards

of a de novo trial."9 Because the defendant's apprehension of retaliation
will deter him from exercising his statutory right of appeal, the Court
concluded that the situation "pose[d] a realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness' "10 and held that raising the charge at a trial de novo

violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The rationale of Blackledge v. Perry is derived from previous
Supreme Court decisions that preclude states from "chilling" the exer-

cise of constitutional rights."2 The Court has carefully scrutinized actions by states that deter defendants from exercising their rights by

penalizing those who assert them,' 3 finding some of these burdens unconstitutional. 14 Three situations in which the states have placed.
burdens on the exercise of constitutional rights have been considered.
In the first situation, a burden is placed on the assertion of a single
constitutional right. The Court has held that in this situation a state may

compel defendants to choose between asserting or waiving a constituof a trial." Id. at 31, quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973). Because Perry
could not be tried at all for the felony charge, the Court departed from precedent and
granted Perry relief without regard to his guilty plea.
A full discussion of the ramifications of this aspect of the decision is beyond the
scope of this note. Blackledge, however, upsets the finality of some guilty plea convictions. The Court did not state what other constitutional rights are "power"-related but
indicated that double jeopardy has similar characteristics. See 417 U.S. at 31.
6. 417 U.S. at 25. The defendant also argued that raising the charge at a trial de
novo violated the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, but the Court did not
reach this issue.
7. See id. at 27; note 31 infra.
8. 417 U.S. at 27.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id. at 27.
11. Id. at 28-29.
12. See id. at 25; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
13. See generally 417 U.S. at 25; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
14. Some have not been struck down. 417 U.S. at 27; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 30-32 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Crampton v.
Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 212 (1971).
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tional right so long as "compelling the election [does not impair] to an
appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."'1 In
Griffin v. California0 the Court held that a prosecutor may not com-

ment to the jury on the fact that the defendant did not testify at trial.
The Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination outlawed the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice" and that to
allow the prosecutor to draw negative inferences from the defendant's
exercise of the privilege would severely undercut its meaning.1 7 In
Crampton v. Ohio,'8 however, the Court found that the policies behind
the fifth amendment privilege did not necessitate separate trials on the

issues of guilt and punishment when the decision on each is left to the
jury. The Court recognized that at a single trial the defendant may be

deterred from exercising his fifth amendment privilege in order to testify
on the issue of punishment. The defendant might, therefore, elect to
testify, thus possibly damaging his case on the issue of guilt.1 9 Nevertheless, since the policies behind the privilege do not preclude cross-

examination and impeachment of a defendant who takes the stand, even
though his case on guilt may thus be damaged, the Court found that the
burden placed on the defendant's right in Crampton was not unconstitutional.20

In the second situation, a single burden inhibits the exercise of
more than one constitutional right. In this situation the Supreme Court
has looked solely to the effect of the burden on the exercise of the
constitutional rights involved. In Simmons v. United States2' the Court

held that a burden that compels a defendant to choose between asserting
one constitutional right or another is unconstitutional. Likewise, in
United States v. Jackson22 the Court declared unconstitutional a portion
15. Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
16. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
17. Id. at 614-15.
18. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
19. Id. at 214-15.
20. Id. at 216-17.
21. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons the defendant testified at a hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence from an allegedly illegal search and seizure. His testimony
was admitted at trial against him on the issue of guilt. The Court reversed the conviction
holding that a state may not require a defendant to surrender his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in order to assert a fourth amendment right; to
compel an election between rights is unconstitutional. Id. at 394.
22. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). In Jackson the defendant claimed he was compelled to
plead guilty to a charge under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1970), since the death penalty could be imposed only by the jury. The Court found that
the punishment provision in the statute not only deterred the defendant from asserting
his sixth amendment right to jury trial but also his fifth amendment privilege not to
plead guilty. 390 U.S. at 581.
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of a statute that inhibited the exercise of the defendant's sixth amendment right to jury trial and fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Even though the Court found that there was a valid
purpose behind the statute, its effect on the exercise of basic rights made
23
the statute unconstitutional.
The third situation the Court has considered is that in which a state
places a burden on the right of appeal. The Constitution does not
require the states to grant appeals from criminal convictions. 24 Once
avenues of review are established, however, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects the defendant's free exercise of his
statutory right.2 5 When the right of appeal is concerned, the Court has
developed a unique standard for determining whether a burden is
unconstitutional. Instead of looking solely to the effect the burden has
on exercising the right to appeal, the Court examines the State's purpose
for imposing the burden. If the State's purpose is to deter appeals, the
26
actions are "vindictive" and the burden is unconstitutional.
The "vindictiveness" standard was first articulated by the Court in
North Carolinav. Pearce. In Pearce the Supreme Court invalidated a
higher sentence received by the defendant from the same court following
a successful appeal and reconviction. Since there was a likelihood that
the sentence was imposed in retaliation against the defendant for pursuing an appeal, 28 the Court found that-the increased sentence operated as
a penalty. The Court recognized that apprehension of such retaliation
would deter other defendants from seeking appellate review and therefore held that due process limited judicial discretion in determining
sentences." The decision, however, was not based on the actual motives
or apprehensions of the persons involved. The Court instead drew its
conclusions from an analysis of the objective circumstances." °
The factors presenting what the Court has termed the "hazards of
vindictiveness" were explored more fully in two subsequent cases.3 1 In
23. 390 U.S. at 591.
24. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687 (1894).
25. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 25 n.4; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 724 (1969); see also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
26. See 417 U.S. at 25-26; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
27. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
28. Id. at 724-25.
29. Id. at 724.
30. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 28. The Court specifically stated that in
Blackledge there was no evidence of actual maliciousness on the part of the prosecutor.
31. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
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Colten v. Kentucky"2 defendant was convicted in district court and
appealed to the superior court for a trial de novo. Following his conviction in the superior court defendant received a longer sentence than he
had received in the district court. The defendant in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe83 was initially tried and sentenced by a jury and successfully
appealed his conviction. He was retried by a different jury which imposed a longer sentence. In both of these cases the Supreme Court found
that the increased sentence did not constitute an unconstitutional burden
on appeal.3" According to the Court, the key element of "vindictiveness," a motive for retaliation, was absent.
Colten turned on the fact that the court which imposed the second
sentence was different from the court imposing the first sentence.88
Unlike in Pearce, the judge at the trial de novo is not asked to do again
what he thought he had done properly the first time.30 In Chaffin, not
only were the two juries different, but the Supreme Court found that, in
general, juries do not have an institutional interest in discouraging
appeals. 7 Although in both contexts a burden is placed on appeal since
a longer sentence can result, the increase is permissible because it is not
designed to deter appeals. 8
The decision in Blackledge v. Perry is a logical extension of these
cases. The Court focused for the first time on the actions of the
prosecutor to determine if an unconstitutional burden was placed on
appeal. In order to discern whether the purpose of raising the charge
was to deter appeals, the Court examined the situation to see if it
"pose[d] a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness'.1 39 The elements of
vindictiveness were satisfied: 1) a penalty or burden-the increased
32. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
33. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
34. Id. at 26; 407 U.S. at 116.
35. 407 U.S. at 116.
36. Id. The Court may be right in concluding that one type of retaliatory motive
stems from the fact that the court imposing sentence has been corrected on appeal and
this factor is absent at the trial de novo. The Court, however, failed to take into account
the institutional interest in discouraging appeals that all courts have in common. The
pressure of the backlog of criminal cases could easily provide a strong motivation for
judges to discourage appeals. Even though a trial de novo is a new trial on the merits, it
is certain that the judge knows that the case is an appeal filling up his dooket. See Alpin,
Sentence Increases on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427,
432-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Alpin].
37. 412 U.S. at 27.
38. Id. at 29; 407 U.S. at 116. In both Chaffin and Colten the Court found that the
jury and judge possess the power to determine punishment on the basis of a fresh
evaluation of the evidence and demeanor of the defendant. Flexibility in this process was
seen to serve a legitimate purpose. 412 U.S. at 32; 407 U.S. at 117.
39. 417 U.S. at 27.

.x.
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charge-resulted from the defendant's exercise of his right of appeal; 40

2) a motive for retaliationwas present since the prosecutor has a desire
to conserve state resources; 41 and 3) the same state representative, the

prosecutor, was involved throughout the appellate procedure.42
The Court concluded that since fear of prosecutorial vindictiveness

would deter defendants from exercising their right of appeal, the due

process clause of the fourteenth amendment precluded the prosecutor
from raising the charge at a trial de novo.4 3 This absolute prohibition

against increasing the charge is a more drastic remedy than the one
fashioned by the Court in North Carolina v. Pearce.44 ]In Pearce the
Court permitted the judge to increase the sentence following an appeal if
the increase was supported by objective evidence of the defendant's
conduct ascertained subsequent to the first hearing. 45 This remedy was

purportedly designed to eliminate the motivation for retaliation.46 The
remedy may more accurately be viewed as designed to dispell the

defendant's fear of retaliation by removing the court's ability to penalize
him. 47 The motivation to deter appeals may still be present, but the
method of implementing it is eliminated. Realization by the defendant
that a penalty cannot be imposed for appealing relieves the burden on
appeal.

The remedies for vindictiveness, however, do not reflect solely the
perspective of the defendant. Rather, the apprehensions of the defendant

are balanced against policy considerations that favor retaining discretion
by the party imposing the burden.48 In Pearce, for example, the Court
allowed the judge to retain some discretion in sentencing. Flexibility in

the sentencing process is balanced against the deterrent effect an in40. Id. at 27-28.
41. Id. at 27. The necessity of the presence of this factor is seen by the Court's
decisions in Chaffin and Colten, see text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
42. 417 U.S. at 27.
43. Id. at 28-29.
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the remedy
fashioned by the majority went beyond the identified wrong. 417 U.S. at 34. He felt the
appropriate remedy would be to resentence the defendant in accordance with Pearce and
let the felony conviction stand. 417 U.S. at 39. Although the sentence a defendant
receives is the greatest deterrent to appeal, Justice Rehnquist did not take into account
the collateral consequences flowing from a felony conviction such as loss of voting rights
in some states. Resentencing the defendant would not remove these further penalties on
the defendant. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequencesof a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VANr. L. REv. 929, 955-60 (1970); text accompanying notes 46-53 infra.
45. 395 U.S. at 726.
46. Id. at 725-26.
47. See 417 U.S. at 28.
48. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724.
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creased sentence has on appeal. By limiting the increase to those situations in which the defendant's conduct warrants increased punishment,

the judge can "[fit the punishment to] the offender and not merely the
crime"49 while assuring the defendant that the increase will not be

imposed vindictively.
The balance between the state's interest and the defendant's interest is resolved differently when the prosecutor is involved. The policies

favoring judicial discretion and flexibility in sentencing are not applicable to prosecutorial discretion in determining charges. The defendant's

apprehension of retaliation is greater in the Blackledge situation because
the prosecutor is his adversary. 50 There is no way to make the power to
raise the charge conditional on a showing of a permissible purpose and
at the same time remove the penalty on the defendant that deters
appeals. While there may be permissible reasons for raising the charge
in some cases, such as the discovery of new evidence, the defendant's

apprehension of retaliation would not be dispelled. The defendant in the
Pearce situation maintains a degree of control over an increase in
sentence by his conduct.5 1 After the initial charge in the Blackledge

situation, however, the prosecutor and not the defendant has control
over increasing the charge.5" The fact that the prosecutor could later

justify his actions to a court and show that there was no actual vindic49. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
50. Justice Rehnquist noted that the prosecutor is a "natural adversary" of the
defendant but did not think that this fact would contribute to the possibility of
vindictiveness. It is rather peculiar that a judge, as in Pearce, who is presumably
impartial to the issue of defendant's guilt would necessitate greater scrutiny than a
prosecutor whose job is to obtain convictions. 417 U.S. at 32-34; see Alpin, supra note
36, at 452.
51. It is uncertain exactly what type of objective evidence is permissible to support
an increase in sentence. The Court stated that it must be "objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of
the original sentencing proceeding." 395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). Although this
language strongly indicates that evidence of prior conduct of the defendant coming to the
judge's attention for the first time at the second sentencing hearing would be excluded,
the Supreme Court will have to clarify this point. See Alpin, supra note 36, at 444-45.
52. The factors which would cause a prosecutor to raise the charge bear no
relationship to anything the defendant does, but depend upon external events. The
discovery of new evidence, for instance, supporting a higher charge depends upon the
thoroughness of the prosecutor's investigation. Justice Rehnquist notes that a prosecutor
may seek a lower court determination because it is expeditious even though he has the
evidence to obtain a conviction on a higher charge. 417 U.S. at 34. In each case, the
opportunity for raising the charge is not tied to any action by the defendant other than
appeal. Because the prosecutor has a great deal to gain from deterring appeals the
defendant will always view the actions as vindictive. Whereas in Pearce the defendant
could control the length of sentence by ordering his conduct accordingly, in Blackledge
the only way the defendant can be assured the charge will not be raised is to refrain
from appealing.
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tiveness does not remove the defendant's fear of retaliation. The defendant will still view the power to raise the charge as an opportunity for
retaliation and will thus be deterred from appealing.
Although society has an interest in convicting the defendant for the
highest offense his conduct warrants, the prosecutor serves this interest
by bringing the initial charge. Once the charge has been brought, the
defendant's interest in a fair trial must be served. If a defendant is
deterred from appealing he has lost his only opportunity for a review of
the fairness of his conviction. The power of the prosecutor to raise the
charge on appeal has too grave an effect on the rights of the defendant
to give the prosecutor a second chance to promote society's interest.
The rationale of Blackledge may be applied to curtail the power of
the prosecutor to raise the charge following appeal in three contexts
outside the trial de novo:5 3 1) when the pciltor~indicts the defendant for a higher charge based on the same conduct following normal
channels of appeal; 54 2) when the prosecutor reindicts the defendant
under a recidivist statute calling for increased punishment on conviction;5 5 and 3) when the defendant is tried on the original indictment
after successfully challenging a guilty plea conviction on a lesser included offense."
The first two situations present the same elements of vindictiveness
found in Blackledge. The same retaliatory motive recognized in Blackledge is present in both. Reindicting the defendant on a higher charge
or under a recidivist statute operates as a penalty for pursuing an appeal
and the state's representative, the prosecutor, is involved throughout the
proceedings. Since the defendant's apprehension of prosecutorial vindictiveness would deter him from appealing, the remedy fashioned in
Blackledge may be appropriately extended to limit the charge on retrial
of the defendant to that originally brought.5 7
53. Twenty-five states have a trial de novo system that will be affected by the
decision in Blackledge: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112
n.4 (1972).
54. Alpin, supra note 36, at 451; see, e.g., Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793
(S.D. Iowa 1969).
55. Alpin, supra note 36, at 451; see, e.g., Kansas v. Young, 200 Kan. 20, 434 P.2d
820 (1968).
56. See Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970); Note, The Constitutionality
of Reindicting Successful Plea-Bargain Appellants on the Original Higher Charge, 62
CAr.. L. REv. 258 (1974); cf. Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
57. In Ewell v. United States, 383 U.S. 116 (1965), the Supreme Court earlier
rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the retrying of a defendant on additional charges
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The situation in which a defendant is retried on the original charge
after successfully challenging a guilty plea to a lesser included offense

presents a different question. A plea bargain consists of a guilty plea by
the defendant in return for a moderate sentence or a conviction on a

lesser included offense. An appeal from a plea bargain is generally
limited to a consideration of the voluntariness of the guilty plea.r 8
Although the likelihood of retrial on the original charge contained

in the indictment may deter a defendant from exercising his right of
appeal, it is doubtful that the state has placed any burden on the right of
appeal at all. In a sense, the plea bargain falls outside the normal

channels of the criminal process. The defendant who participates in a
plea bargain has been relieved of trial on the greater charge by pleading

guilty to a lesser offense. A successful appeal places him in the same
position that he was in prior to the guilty plea. The charge on retrial is
the same charge that initiated the proceedings against the defendant; the

prosecutor has not "upped the ante." The defendant is deterred from
appeal not because the state has imposed a burden, but because the

defendant has received a benefit that he does not want to relinquish.59
By holding that prosecutorial vindictiveness can place an unconstitutional burden on the right of appeal, the Supreme Court has liberated

the concept of vindictiveness from the sentencing context. The reasoning
in Blackledge v. Perry indicates that the holding may extend beyond the

limited situation of the trial de novo to curtail the power of the prosecutor to raise the charge following normal channels of appeal. Blackledge
arising from the same conduct that formed the basis for the original indictment. The
precedential effect of the Ewell decision, however, is questionable. Ewell arose prior to
the Court's articulation of the "vindictiveness" standard in North Carolina v. Pearce. In
addition, Ewell was decided on double jeopardy grounds. The Court made a distinction in
Pearce between the two claims. Even in Pearce, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the increase in sentence violated the double jeopardy clause. 395 U.S. at
719-21. The Court, however, went on to rule in favor of the defendant on due process
grounds. Id. at 725-26. If a case similar to Ewell were presented to the Court today, the
Court could easily find a due process violation without overruling Ewell.
58. See note 5 supra.
59. But see Note, 62 CAi'. L. REv., supra note 56. Plea bargaining presents
special problems in criminal procedure that the Court has not squarely faced. Retrial on
the original charge is a deterrent to appeal even though it does not fit into the
vindictiveness analysis. Although the defendant may be retried on the original charge
because of the actual desire of the prosecutor to secure the finality of convictions, society
has a greater interest in securing a conviction on the highest charge the evidence
supports. Unlike in Blackledge, society's interest was never fully served because of the
plea bargain. The defendant's interest is not protected since he may be deterred from
appeal. The only true benefit of plea bargaining is the fast and final disposition of cases.
Because plea bargaining is so widespread, it should be thoroughly examined by the
Supreme Court and constitutional standards should be determined.
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and other cases applying the vindictiveness standard indicate that
some burdens may be placed on the defendant's right of appeal, but that

acts of the state designed to deter appeals are unconstitutional.
Avis E. BLACK

The Statute of Frauds-Application of the Main Po.pose Rule:

Eliminating a Short Cut Through the "Corporate Veil"
The statute of frauds makes unenforceable the promise of one

person to assume the debt or to guarantee the credit of another unless
the promise or guarantee is supported by a writing signed by the

promisor.1 The chief limitation on this application of the statute is the
so-called "main purpose" or "leading object" rule, which defeats the

operation of the statute when the promisor has a personal pecuniary
interest in the transaction concerned. 2 In Burlington Industries v. Foil3
the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to clarify what had be-

come a haphazard application of the main purpose rule to oral representations made by corporate officers, directors, or shareholders concerning
corporate debt. The opinion adhered to the classical standard for appli-

cation of the main purpose rule, rejecting any per se application of the
rule in the context of the close corporation.
The two individual defendants in Burlington, Martin B. Foil, Jr.,
and William H. Taylor, both were officers, directors, and shareholders

in the bankrupt, Colonial Fabrics, Inc., a North Carolina corporation.4
Colonial, a close corporation, 5 was organized in 1970 and achieved a
1. This provision has remained essentially unchanged since the passage of the
original statute of frauds in 1676. The act was originally titled "An Act for the
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries." 29 CAR. II, c. 3 (1676).
2. A clear statement of the main purpose rule is found in Emerson v. Slater, 63
U.S. (22 How.) 28, 43 (1859):
[Wihenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own,
involving either a benefit to himself, or damage to the other contracting party,
his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise
to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability.
This portion of the Emerson opinion is quoted verbatim by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Burlington Indus. v. Foil, 284 N.C. 740, 748, 202 S.E.2d 591, 597 (1974).
3. 284 N.C. 740, 202 S.E.2d 591 (1974).
4. Id. at 741, 202 S.E.2d at 593.
5. Colonial's president, E. B. Fowler, owned one-half of the stock. Defendants

